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421 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN SCHOOLS AND THE RIGHT TO 
PARTICIPATION:WHEN THE FIRST AMENDMENT 




Public schools are necessarily not run as a democracy. Schools exist to 
provide a forum whereby those with wisdom and experience (the 
teachers) impart knowledge to those who lack wisdom and experience 
(the students). 
-Lowery v. Euverard1 
Amanda Walker-Serrano created a petition stating, “[w]e 3rd grade 
kids don’t want to go to the circus because they hurt animals. We want a 
better feild [sic] trip.”2 Derek Kelly drew gang signs on his school 
papers.3 Jacob Pinard refused to play a basketball game to demonstrate 
the team’s sincerity concerning claims against an abusive coach.4 Ryan 
Posthumus called the assistant principal a “dick.”5 First Amendment 
freedom of speech doctrine perceives Amanda’s petition, Derek’s 
drawing, Jacob’s refusal, and Ryan’s curse as types of speech. This 
 
 * Ll.B., Ll.M., Ph.D., Head, Management of Educational Systems Program, Department of 
Leadership and Policy in Education, Faculty of Education, University of Haifa, Israel. The idea to 
write this article developed nine years ago, when I was a student at New York University School of 
Law. The powerful legal culture of school children’s freedom of speech amazed me and raised the 
questions that were the basis for this study. The gradual implementation process of the right to 
participation in Israeli law, as well as my developing experience in teaching and in mothering, 
assisted in materializing the initial ideas. I would like to thank Elad Peled, Michael Birnhack, Arie 
Kizel, and Tali Gal for helpful comments and conversations. I would also like to thank John Calhoun 
for excellent research and editing assistance. Thanks also to the participants at the “Children’s 
Rights: Legal and Educational Perspectives” seminar at the University of Haifa Faculty of 
Education. This article is dedicated to my daughters Ella and Maya, who teach me invaluable lessons 
each and every day about the benefits, and challenges of children’s participation. 
 1  497 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 2  Walker-Serrano ex rel. Walker v. Leonard, 325 F.3d 412, 414 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 3  Kelly v. Bd. of Educ., No. 06 C 1512, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1824 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 
2007). 
 4  Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 5  Posthumus v. Bd. of Educ. of Mona Shores Pub. Sch., 380 F. Supp. 2d 891, 895 (W.D. 
Mich. 2005). 
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Article will look to the contours of children’s right to participation in 
Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child6 
in order to argue for distinctions between the types of student speech we 
should protect and the types we should not. The Article’s primary aim is 
to offer educators, lawyers, judges, and scholars innovative perspectives 
to assist in analyzing children’s controversial expressions in schools and 
in shaping just and educative policies for coping with those expressions. 
Long before the ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (“CRC”), international human rights law granted children special 
protection from abuse, neglect, and exploitation, and guaranteed their 
social and economic rights, such as education, health care, and an 
adequate standard of living.7 The CRC synthesized standards scattered 
among many international documents and introduced an additional—and 
revolutionary—dimension to the rights of children in international law, 
which recognized children as agents who share the power to shape their 
own lives.8 The right to participation, anchored in Article 12, is the core 
of the innovative approach that the CRC promoted.9 It provides as 
follows: 
States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or 
her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters 
affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in 
accordance with the age and maturity of the child. 
This provision includes two elements. The first is the child’s right to 
express views freely in all matters affecting the child. The second is the 
child’s right to have his or her views given due weight in accordance 
with his or her age and maturity. 
Article 12 is followed by Article 13, which protects children’s 
freedom of expression and states the following: 
 
 6  Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into 
force Sept. 2, 1990). 
 7  Gerison Lansdown, Promoting Children’s Participation in Democratic Decision-Making, 
INNOCENTI INSIGHT,  Feb. 2000, at 1, available at http://www.unicef-
irc.=org/publications/pdf/insight6.pdf. 
 8  See id.; Thomas Hammarberg, The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child—and How 
to Make It Work, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 97 (1990). During the 1970s, the American “child liberation 
movement” advocated for children’s rights to independent decision-making. See, e.g., CHARLES 
E. SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN THE CLASSROOM (1971); JOHN C. HOLT, ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD 
(1974); RICHARD FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS (1974). 
 9  Lansdown, supra note 7, at 1. Additional provisions in the CRC that treat children as 
agents who shape their own lives are the right to freedom of conscience, thought and religion 
(Article 14), the right to freedom of association (Article 15), and the right to information (Article 
17). A complementary provision protects parental rights to provide appropriate direction and 
guidance “in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child” (Article 5). 
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1. The child shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right 
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, 
in the form of art, or through any other media of the child’s choice. 
2. The exercise of this right may be subject to certain restrictions, but 
these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: 
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; or 
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order . . .  or 
of public health or morals. 
Article 13(2) restricts children’s freedom of expression by limitations 
similar to those described in the four landmark U.S. Supreme Court cases 
regarding school children’s freedom of speech. Article 13(2)(a), which 
concerns “the rights or reputations of others,” and Article 13(2)(b), 
which relates to the protection of public “order,” correspond to the ruling 
in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.10 
Tinker limited children’s freedom of expression by refusing to protect 
speech that invades the rights of others or creates material and substantial 
disruption to the work and discipline of the school. The last part of 
Article 13(2)(b), which justifies restrictions on children’s free speech for 
public “morals,” corresponds to the pedagogical rationales of Bethel 
School District v. Fraser,11 Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,12 
and Morse v. Frederick.13 
The right to participation and the freedom of speech offer two 
normative frameworks for analyzing school children’s expressions. What 
is the difference between these normative frameworks? Do they have the 
same justifications? How do they correspond in educational 
environments? These are the questions that animate this Article. 
This Article’s insights are highly relevant to scholars and 
practitioners of U.S. constitutional law. The First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, which protects freedom of speech, was the 
basis for review of dozens of American cases regarding students’ speech 
in schools. During the last few years, in the wake of the Morse ruling, 
American scholars have discussed the question of freedom of speech in 
school at great length. Comprehensive studies offered new analytical 
approaches,14 or criticized the courts for providing too much15 or too 
 
 10  393 U.S. 503, 513–14 (1969). 
 11  478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 12  484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 13  551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 14  Martin H. Redish, & Kevin Finnerty, What Did You Learn in School Today—Free 
Speech, Values Inculcation, and the Democratic–Educational Paradox, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 62 
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little16 protection for students’ speech. More focused studies explored 
specific settings, such as school sponsored activities,17 online speech,18 
and online schools,19 or specific kinds of messages, such as expressions 
with sexual overtones20 or cyber bullying.21 This Article expands the 
 
(2002) (suggesting an “anti-indoctrination” model for the judiciary to reasonably police the 
educational process in order to restrict values inculcation to that essential minimum degree required 
for the educational process to function); Erwin Chemerinsky, Teaching That Speech Matters: A 
Framework for Analyzing Speech Issues in Schools, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 825 (2009) (suggesting a 
distinction between government control over the curriculum and student speech outside the school’s 
curriculum); Bryan R. Warnick, Student Speech Rights and the Special Characteristics of the School 
Environment, 38 EDUC. RESEARCHER 200 (2009) (analyzing special characteristics of the school 
environment that should be evaluated in students’ free speech cases); Lee Goldman, Student Speech 
and the First Amendment: A Comprehensive Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 395 (2011) (arguing that 
student speech should be treated differently depending upon whether the speech occurs under school 
supervision); Emily Gold Waldman, Badmouthing Authority: Hostile Speech About School Officials 
and the Limits of School Restrictions, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 591 (2011) (suggesting 
separating harassment from dissent). 
 15  R. George Wright, Tinker and Student Free Speech Rights: A Functionalist Alternative, 
41 IND. L. REV. 105 (2008); Alan Brownstein, The Nonforum as a First Amendment Category: 
Bringing Order Out of the Chaos of Free Speech Cases Involving School-Sponsored Activities, 42 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717 (2009); ANNE PROFFITT DUPRE, SPEAKING UP: THE UNINTENDED COSTS OF 
FREE SPEECH IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2010). 
 16  Clay Calvert, Misuse and Abuse of Morse v. Frederick by Lower Courts: Stretching the 
High Court’s Ruling Too Far to Censor Student Expression, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1 (2008); Abby 
Marie Mollen, In Defense of the “Hazardous Freedom” of Controversial School Speech, 102 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1501 (2008); Joanna Nairn, Free Speech 4 Students? Morse v. Frederick and the Inculcation 
of Values in Schools, 43 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 239 (2008); Jamin B. Raskin, No Enclaves of 
Totalitarianism: The Triumph and Unrealized Promise of the Tinker Decision, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 
1193 (2009); Aaron H. Caplan, Freedom of Speech in School and Prison, 85 WASH. L. REV. 71 
(2010); Dan V. Kozlowski, Toothless Tinker: The Continued Erosion of Student Speech Rights, 
88(2) JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 352 (2011); Josie Foehrenbach Brown, Inside Voices: 
Protecting the Student-Critic in Public Schools, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 253 (2012); Chemerinsky, supra 
note 14. 
 17  Brownstein, supra note 15. 
 18  Brannon P. Denning & Molly C. Taylor, Morse v. Frederick and the Regulation of 
Student Cyberspeech, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 835 (2008); Kyle W. Brenton, Note, 
Bonghits4jesus.com? Scrutinizing Public School Authority over Student Cyberspeech Through the 
Lens of Personal Jurisdiction, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1206 (2008); Benjamin F. Heidlage, A Relational 
Approach to Schools’ Regulation of Youth Online Speech, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 572 (2009); Mickey 
Lee Jett, Note, The Reach of the Schoolhouse Gate: The Fate of Tinker in the Age of Digital Social 
Media, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 895 (2012); Rory Allen Weeks, The First Amendment, Public School 
Students, and the Need for Clear Limits on School Officials’ Authority over Off-Campus Student 
Speech, 46 GA. L. REV. 1157 (2012); Brittany L. Kaspar, Note, Beyond the Schoolhouse Gate: 
Should Schools Have the Authority to Punish Online Student Speech?, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 187 
(2012); Aaron J. Hersh, Note, Rehabilitating Tinker: A Modest Proposal to Protect Public-School 
Students’ First Amendment Free-Expression Rights in the Digital Age, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1309 
(2013); Allison Martin, Comment, Tinkering with the Parameters of Student Free Speech Rights for 
Online Expression: When Social Networking Sites Knock on the Schoolhouse Gate, 43 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 773 (2013). 
 19  Brett T. MacIntyre, Comment, When the Classroom Is Not in the Schoolhouse: Applying 
Tinker to Student Speech at Online Schools, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1503 (2013). 
 20   Clay Calvert, Mixed Messages, Muddled Meanings, Drunk Dicks, and Boobies 
Bracelets: Sexually Suggestive Student Speech and the Need to Overrule or Radically Refashion 
Fraser, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 131 (2012).  
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inquiry by offering an innovative analysis, which may assist in setting 
the scope of the educational rationales that justify restrictions on the free 
speech of children in school. Although the United States is one of only 
three United Nations members that did not ratify the CRC,22 the right of 
children to participate at school is consistent with American values23 and 
with the pivotal role children have played in building American 
democracy and social justice.24 
This Article will also interest the growing community of 
international scholars who study children’s participation in educational 
environments, and those who provided implementation guidelines for 
countries that signed the CRC.25 The Article contributes a unique angle 
to this scholarly field by analyzing a significant subject that has not yet 
been explored and that is very important to educators who cope with 
controversial expressions on a daily basis. 
The following section (Section II) examines the conceptual and 
 
 21  Darryn Cathryn Beckstrom, State Legislation Mandating School Cyberbullying Policies 
and the Potential Threat to Students’ Free Speech Rights, 33 VT. L .  REV. 283 (2008); Jocelyn Ho, 
Bullied to Death: Cyberbullying and Student Online Speech Rights, 64 FLA. L. REV. 789 (2012); 
Stacie A. Stewart, Comment, A Trade-Off That Becomes a Rip-Off: When Schools Can’t Regulate 
Cyberbullying, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1645 (2013). 
 22  The United States signed the CRC in 1995 but never ratified it. To date, the United States 
is one of only three United Nations members that did not ratify the CRC. Other non-ratifying 
members include Somalia, whose President declared in November 2013 his intent to ratify the CRC, 
and the new United Nations member South Sudan, which passed a bill to ratify the CRC. 
See Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
11&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Apr. 10, 2014). 
 23  See Susan Kilbourne, The Wayward Americans—Why the USA Has Not Ratified the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 10 CHILD. & FAM. L. Q. 243 (1998). 
American opponents to the CRC ratification make two arguments. One asserts that United States 
ratification of the CRC would be tantamount to surrendering American sovereignty. Id. at 244. The 
second type of argument focuses on Articles that American critics interpret as threatening parental 
rights. Id. None of these arguments concern freedom of speech in school.   
 24  Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Courage of Innocence: Children As Heroes in the 
Struggle for Justice, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1567, 1589 (2009). In her inspiring paper Bennett 
Woodhouse describes how children of all ages, but especially adolescents, have been key figures in 
American social justice movements, including the labor movement, the civil rights movement, the 
movement for gender equality, the movement for inclusion of persons with disabilities, and the 
struggle to secure equal access to education. Id. at 1568. 
 25  See, e.g., Priscilla Alderson, School Students’ Views on School Councils and Daily Life 
at School, 14 CHILD. & SOC’Y 121 (2000); Zoran Pavlovic, Cross-Cultural Study on the Rights of 
the Child in Slovenia: The First Ten Years, 22 SCH. PSYCHOL. INT’L 130 (2001); Anne Stafford et 
al., ‘Having a Say’: Children and Young People Talk About Consultation, 17 CHILD. & SOC’Y 361 
(2003); Michael Fielding, Leadership, Radical Student Engagement and the Necessity of Person-
Centred Education, 9 INT’L J. OF LEADERSHIP IN EDUC. 299 (2006); Dana L. Mitra & Steven Jay 
Gross, Increasing Student Voice in High School Reform: Building Partnerships, Improving 
Outcomes, 37(4) EDUC. MANAGEMENT, ADMIN. & LEADERSHIP 522 (2009); Gillean McCluskey et 
al., ‘Take More Time to Actually Listen’: Students’ Reflections on Participation and Negotiation in 
School, 39(2) BRIT. EDUC. RES. J. 287 (2013). 
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structural differences between the right to participation and freedom of 
speech in school. Section III analyzes the justifications for respecting, 
protecting, and fulfilling the right to participation and freedom of speech 
in school. Section IV(A) presents the four U.S. Supreme Court 
precedents that laid down several rationales for limiting school children’s 
speech. Section IV(B) examines the interrelationships between the 
children’s right to participation and free speech in school by analyzing 
56 cases of American courts. It categorizes the cases and explores how 
the right to participation may influence a free speech analysis in each and 
every category. Section V offers conclusions and suggestions for future 
research. It also accounts for the role of empowered teachers as agents of 
children’s participation rights. 
II. CHILDREN’S RIGHTS TO PARTICIPTION AND FREE SPEECH: 
CONCEPTUAL AND STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES 
This Section argues that that there are several conceptual and 
structural differences between the right to participation and freedom of 
speech in schools. These differences stem from the character of the right 
to participation as a dialogic right that captures voices that strive for 
influence, leads to a gradual shift of power, and requires dialogic 
organizational spaces. The distinctions established in this Section will be 
redeployed in Section IV in order to analyze how children’s rights to 
participation and free speech correspond in different situations. 
A. Voices that Strive for Influence 
Laura Lundy offers a model that conceptualizes the right to 
participation by four elements: (1) Space: children must be given the 
opportunity to express a view; (2) Voice: children must be facilitated to 
express their views; (3) Audience: the view must be listened to; and (4) 
Influence: the view must be acted upon, as appropriate.26 Lundy’s model 
deconstructs the two elements of the right to participation. The right to 
express views freely in all matters affecting the child requires space and 
voice. The right that these views would be given due weight in 
 
 26  Laura Lundy, “Voice” Is Not Enough: Conceptualizing Article 12 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 6 BRIT. EDUC. RES. J. 927 (2007). Lundy also argues that 
Article 12 can only be understood fully when it is considered in the light of other relevant CRC 
provisions; in particular, Article 2 (non-discrimination); Article 3 (best interests); Article 5 (right to 
guidance); Article 13 (right to seek, receive and impart information); and Article 19 (protection from 
abuse). Id. at 933. This argument lays on the principle of indivisibility, interdependence, and 
interconnectedness of all human rights. Id. at 932. 
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Figure 1: The interrelationships of the right to participation and freedom of 
speech 
accordance with the age and maturity of the child requires audience and 
influence. 
According to Lundy, the right of children to freedom of expression is 
intertwined with the element of voice.27 However, not all kinds of speech 
overlap with the right to participation. As Article 12(1) elaborates, the 
right to participation concerns views “in all matters affecting the child” 
that can be given “due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of 
the child.”28 The views that are captured by the right to participation are, 
therefore, those that open a dialogue with adults and strive for 
influence—the fourth feature in Lundy’s model. The following figure 
conceptualizes the interrelationships of the right to participation and the 
freedom of speech. 
As this figure reflects, the right to participation captures only those 
voices that may turn eventually into influence. The distinction concerns 
the goal of the expressions. Children’s participatory expressions may be 
unpleasant, rebellious, and sometimes hurt those whose behaviors are 
being criticized.29 Yet, they deserve special protection because they aim 
 
 27  Id. at 936. 
 28  Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, Article 
12(1), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV11&chapter=4& 
lang= en (last visited Apr. 10, 2014). 
 29  Nigel Thomas writes that children’s right to participation is too often described in non-
conflictual terms “as if all that is required is for children and adults to sit down and talk together, and 
all will be well.” Nigel Thomas, Love, Rights and Solidarity: Studying Children’s Participation 
Using Honneth’s Theory of Recognition, 19 CHILDHOOD 453, 463 (2012). See also E. Kay M. 
Tisdall, Is the Honeymoon Over? Children and Young People’s Participation in Public Decision-
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to change policies and practices. 
B. Gradual Sharing of Power 
Another feature of the dialogic character of the right to participation 
is the gradual shift of power of participatory practices. Classificatory 
models of participation attempted to differentiate between various 
practices by which children may express their voices and participate in 
decision-making.30 These models exemplify the various ways that adults 
can share their power with children. 
The most influential model is Roger Hart’s, which includes an eight-
stage “ladder of participation.”31 At the bottom of the ladder, Hart located 
non-participatory practices, which include manipulation, decoration, and 
tokenism.32 The two next levels refer to practices in which children are 
assigned but informed or consulted and informed.33 The highest levels 
include adult-initiated practices, which share decisions with children, 
child-initiated and directed practices, and at the top child-initiated 
practices that share decisions with adults.34 
Another model that offers a hierarchy of participatory practices is 
Gerison Lansdown’s, which distinguishes between three kinds of 
processes. The first is consultative processes, in which adults initiate 
channels for obtaining information from children. The second is 
participative initiatives, where the aim is to strengthen processes of 
democracy, create opportunities for children to understand and apply 
democratic principles, or involve children in the development of services 
and policies that impact on them. The third is promoting self-advocacy, 
where the aim is to empower children to identify and fulfill their own 
goals and initiatives.35 
 
Making, 16 INT’L J. OF CHILD. RIGHTS 419, 422 (2008) (“There is a distinct risk that activities are 
only labeled ‘participation’ when they fit comfortably into the agendas of the organizing adults—and 
those of funders, policy makers, or governing structures.”); Barry Percy-Smith, Councils, 
Consultations and Community: Rethinking the Spaces for Children and Young People’s 
Participation, 8(2) CHILD. GEOGRAPHIES 107, 111–12 (2010) (arguing that “having a say in matters 
that affect you” does not mean having a say when it suits organizations and services, rather than 
when young people need to communicate needs, issues, ideas and concerns). 
 30  Thomas, supra note 29, at 453–54. Nigel Thomas differentiates between “classificatory” 
and “explanatory” models of participation that were developed over the years. 
 31  Roger A. Hart, Children’s Participation: From Tokenism to Citizenship, INNOCENTI 
ESSAYS NO. 4, Mar. 1992, available at www.unicef-irc.org/publications/100. The model is based on 
Sherry Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation, 35 J. OF THE AM. INST. OF PLANNERS 216 
(1969). 
 32  Hart, supra note 31, at 9–10. 
 33  Id. at 11–12. 
 34  Id. at 12–14. 
 35  Lansdown, supra note 7, at 16. A comparable categorization was suggested by Dana L. 
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Harry Shier’s “pathways to participation” diagram offers additional 
complexities to the hierarchy of participatory practices. Shier categorizes 
five levels of participation: (1) children are listened to; (2) children are 
supported in expressing their views; (3) children’s views are taken into 
account; (4) children are involved in decision-making processes; and (4) 
children share power and responsibility for decision-making.36 At each 
level of participation, Shier notes, individuals and organizations may 
have different degrees of commitment to the process of empowerment.37 
Therefore, he identifies the levels of commitment at each level of 
participation: openings, opportunities, and obligations. An opening 
occurs when there is a personal commitment or a statement of intent to 
work in certain ways. An opportunity occurs when the needs that enable 
the worker or organization to operate at this level in practice are met 
(e.g., resources, training). An obligation is established when policies are 
adopted, enabling a specific level of participation to become built-in to 
the system.38 
The Hart, Lansdown, and Shier models conceptualize participation 
as a gradual shift of power. Higher levels of participation require adults 
to share more power with children, to provide them with more 
opportunities to initiate and direct practices, to advocate their goals, and 
to take responsibly for their actions. Freedom of speech does not require 
adults to share their power with children. It demands that adults not 
prohibit the speech, but it does not force adults to listen. 
C. Dialogic Organizational Spaces 
The right to participation and freedom of speech are mobilized in 
different ways. While speech that does not strive for influence can use 
various media, the right to participation requires organized spaces, in 
which children can transform their voices into influence. Some of these 
spaces have to be unfettered from the control and agenda of adults, so 
that new and creative ideas can be imagined, expressed, and explored.39  
Yet, they should also establish a dialogue, a cooperation between 
 
Mitra and Steven Jay Gross, who portray a “pyramid of student voice,” which begins at the bottom 
with the most common form of being heard, goes on with the level of collaborating with adults, and 
ends with the final level at the top of the pyramid—building capacity for leadership. At the final 
level, students can share in the leadership of the student voice initiative and also serve as a source of 
criticism and protest in schools. Mitra & Gross, supra note 25, at 523–24. 
 36  Harry Shier, Pathways to Participation: Openings, Opportunities and Obligations, 15 
CHILD. AND SOC’Y 107 (2001). 
 37  Id. at 110. 
 38  Id. 
 39  Percy-Smith, supra note 29, at 119. 
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children and adults, in order to transform the children’s innovative ideas 
into policies and practices. 
There is no sharp distinction, however, between these two functions. 
A student council, for example, requires the cooperation of adults to 
fulfill its formal authority to participate in school policy-making, but it 
should also provide the opportunity for free innovation. Additionally, the 
right to participation may be fulfilled by establishing policy-making 
mechanisms in non-formal spaces in which children spend their everyday 
lives. As Barry Percy-Smith argues, more attention is needed to 
opportunities for children and young people to participate more fully in 
everyday community settings—home, school, neighborhood—through 
the actions, choices, relationships, and contributions they make, rather 
than being preoccupied with participation in political and public decision 
making processes in organizations and systems.40 Percy-Smith points to 
the many different forms that participation as active citizenship should 
take in a democracy and shifts the attention out of the committee rooms 
to a wider array of social contexts wherein agency, identity, and 
empowerment, rather than structures, define participation.41 His 
arguments emphasize the opportunities to capture students’ expressions 
in non-formal spaces and mobilize them into influence. Certain 
organizational features, such as restorative practices, collaborative 
learning, or students as key informants in the processes of inspection, 
may enable students’ voices to achieve influence. 
III. CHILDREN’S RIGHTS TO PARTICIPTION AND FREE SPEECH IN 
SCHOOL: EDUCATIONAL, SOCIAL, AND LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS 
There are several justifications for respecting, protecting, and 
fulfilling42 the right to participation and freedom of speech in schools. 
These justifications derive from a range of landmark legal and 
educational studies that focused on various theoretical perspectives 
including children’s rights, students’ voice, civic education, and the 
sociology of childhood. 
A. Educating Children in Democracy and Not for Democracy 
School policy that realizes the right to participation and freedom of 
 
 40  Id. at 109. 
 41  Id. at 110. 
 42  On the obligation to respect, to protect, and to fulfill human rights, see, United Nations, 
Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, International Human Rights Law, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/internationallaw.aspx. 
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speech acknowledges children’s position as actual citizens rather than 
potential citizens in the making.43 Such a policy should be part and parcel 
of citizenship education,44 which is committed to education in, not just 
education for, democracy.45 Moreover, when children exercise their right 
to participation and their freedom of speech they develop political 
literacy - critical thinking and civic skills useful for debate, 
communication, negotiation, and decision-making.46 It is not surprising, 
therefore, that participatory experiences in schools are among the most 
powerful predictors of future civic engagement.47 
The right to participation and freedom of speech emphasize the 
interconnections of political literacy and practices of dissent. Prominent 
scholars of civic education, such as Amy Gutmann and Meira Levinson, 
points to the importance of teaching children to think critically about 
authority48 and to reshape power relations.49 As mentioned, the dialogic 
nature of the right to participation does not mean that it excludes 
rebellious and conflicting voices. Vice versa, as Kay Tisdall warns, there 
is a distinct risk that activities are only labeled “participation” when they 
fit comfortably into the agendas of adults.50 
B. Equalizing Educational Opportunities 
In her influential book, No Citizen Left Behind, Meira Levinson 
argues that there is a civic empowerment gap between low-income 
citizens of color, on the one hand, and middle-class and wealthy white 
citizens, on the other. This gap, she contends, is as large and as 
disturbing as the reading and math achievement gaps, and it also 
 
 43  See Dympna Devine, Children’s Citizenship and the Structuring of Adult–Child Relations 
in the Primary School, 9 CHILDHOOD 303, 317 (2002). See also Jeremy Roche, Children: Rights, 
Participation and Citizenship, 6 CHILDHOOD 475, 484 (1999). 
 44  Devine, supra note 43, at 317. 
 45  Michael Fielding, On the Necessity of Radical State Education: Democracy and the 
Common School, 41 J. OF PHIL. OF EDUC. 539 (2007). 
 46  Devine, supra note 43, at 318; Ruth Sinclair, Participation in Practice: Making it 
Meaningful, Effective and Sustainable, 18 CHILD. & SOC’Y 106, 108 (2004). 
 47  MEIRA LEVINSON, NO CITIZEN LEFT BEHIND 180 (2012). 
 48  AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 51 (1987). 
 49  LEVINSON, supra note 47, at 13. Sarah M. Stitzlein warns that a democracy that 
withholds the right to dissent until one reaches age eighteen risks worrisome results: “[D]issent may 
not be sufficiently valued for its role in maintaining a healthy democracy and therefore may either be 
ignored or squelched within daily political life; or . . . democracy may be allowed to slide into 
continuous and even unwarranted turbulence by adults who employ dissent in unwise or unjustified 
ways.” Sarah M. Stitzlein, The Right to Dissent and its Implications for Schooling, 62 EDUC. 
THEORY 41, 43 (2012). 
 50  Tisdall, supra note 29, at 422. For the importance of dissent to democracy, see CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003); Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005). 
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produces a gap in political participation.51 Levinson’s arguments 
emphasize that when low-income or minority children exercise their 
right to participation they acquire empowering skills that may assist them 
in reshaping their future.52 
Unstructured forms of speech and participation are especially 
important for disempowered children. Research examining participation 
in student councils showed that low-income or non-conformist children 
are usually excluded.53 These children lack the networks and social 
capital that are often the entry point to participatory frameworks.54 The 
unrepresentative compositions of student’ councils, as well as other 
barriers that stem from the involvement of adults in their operation, limit 
the issues that can be discussed.55 Therefore, it is important to allow 
children unstructured forms of speech and participation, in which 
disadvantaged children can have voice. Jean Rudduck and Michael 
Fielding note in this regard that we need to find ways to hear the silent—
or silenced—students, in order to understand why some disengage and 
what would help them get back on track.56 
C. Developing Better Educational Practices 
The right to participation and freedom of speech broaden the 
marketplace of ideas.57 A literature review that explored different 
practices of children’s participation in schools indicates that children 
possess unique knowledge and perspectives that adults cannot fully 
 
 51  See LEVINSON, supra note 47, at 46–55. 
 52  As Sarah M. Stitzlein reminds us, “history has shown us that the well-being of oppressed 
groups is often not elevated until a strong dissenter or a multitude of dissenters working together 
attract attention.” Stitzlein, supra note 49, at 54. 
 53  See Pavlovic, supra note 25, at 134; Michael Wyness, Children, Young People and Civic 
Participation: Regulation and Local Diversity, 58 EDUC. REV. 209, 216 (2006); Nigel Thomas, 
Towards a Theory of Children’s Participation, 15 INT’L J. OF CHILD. RIGHTS 199, 204 (2007); 
Stitzlein, supra note 49, at 54. 
 54  Rachel Hinton, Children’s Participation and Good Governance: Limitations of the 
Theoretical Literature, 16 INT’L J. OF CHILD. RIGHTS 285, 293 (2008). 
 55  See Percy-Smith, supra note 29, at 112; Claire Freeman et al., ‘Professionalizing’ 
Participation: From Rhetoric to Practice, 1 CHILD. GEOGRAPHIES 53 (2003); Anne Stafford et al., 
‘Having a Say’: Children and Young People Talk about Consultation, 17 CHILD. & SOC’Y 361, 368–
69 (2003); McCluskey et al., supra note 25. 
 56  Jean Rudduck & Michael Fielding, Student Voice and the Perils of Popularity, 58 EDUC. 
REV. 219, 228 (2006). 
 57  See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 16 (Elizabeth Rappaport ed., 1978). Mill contends 
that both right and wrong opinions are invaluable in the search for the truth: If the opinion is right, 
they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost 
as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision 
with error. See also SUNSTEIN, supra note 50, at 82.  
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replicate.58 Children’s new and innovative insights may alert schools to 
shortcomings of schools’ current performance.59 Their ideas may lead to 
more accurate, relevant decisions, which may improve policies and 
practices to meet changing needs.60 Moreover, as Barbara Bennett 
Woodhouse notes, children have “the sort of innocence that allows the 
boy in the fable to see and to say that the emperor has no clothes . . . to 
view old injustices with new eyes.”61 Similarly, Emily Buss argues that 
the connection between speech and the pursuit of truth is particularly 
powerful in its application to children since “[a]t no time in life are 
humans more actively devoted to the pursuit of truth than in the period of 
rapid development and education associated with childhood.”62 
D. Improving School Climate 
Research finds that when children’s voices are heard and respected 
they develop a better attitude towards the school.63 However, as John 
Smyth contends, when children feel their lives, experiences, cultures, and 
aspirations are ignored, trivialized, or denigrated by the school and the 
curriculum, they develop hostility towards the institution of schooling.64 
In such cases, they might actively exercise “their right to resist” by 
choosing to “not learn.”65 These insights explain why rebellious 
expressions may actually improve school climate, by making children 
feel their rights are respected. Yet it should be noted that superficial 
implementation of policies that realize children’s rights could increase 
disengagement, distrust, and alienation rather than help to resolve these 
problems.66 
 
 58  Mitra & Gross, supra note 25, at 523-24. See also Anne B. Smith, Children and Young 
People’s Participation Rights in Education, 15 INT’L J. OF CHILD. RIGHTS 147, 158 (2007). 
 59  Michael Fielding, Students as Radical Agents of Change, 2 J. OF EDUC. CHANGE 123 
(2001). See also JULIA FLUTTER & JEAN RUDDOCK, CONSULTING PUPILS: WHAT’S IN IT FOR 
SCHOOLS? (2004). 
 60  Sinclair, supra note 46, at 108. 
 61  Bennett Woodhouse, supra note 24, at 1568–69.  
 62  Emily Buss, Constitutional Fidelity Through Children’s Rights, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 355, 
380 (2004).  
 63  John Smyth, Educational Leadership that Fosters “Student Voice,” 9 INT. J. OF 
LEADERSHIP IN EDUC. 279 (2006); Mitra & Gross, supra note 25, at 533. Warnick, supra note 14, at 
206 (“Through free and open expression—by encouraging students to express what they really 
think—we can identify troubled students who are on the verge of committing violent acts.”). 
 64  Smyth, supra note 63. 
 65  Id. at 282. 
 66  Mitra & Gross, supra note 25, at 536. See also Fielding, supra note 56, at 124; Smith, 
supra note 58, at 159. 
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E. Respecting, Protecting, and Fulfilling Human Rights 
Last, but not least, is the human rights justification for the right to 
participation and freedom of speech, which emphasizes the interrelation 
of these rights to human dignity and autonomy.67 Factors such as age or 
schooling may limit the right to participation and freedom of speech in 
certain circumstances, but they should not obscure the duty to respect, 
protect, and fulfill them as human rights. Moreover, as Laura Lundy 
argues, the right to participation has a “transformative potential” – it may 
act as a multiplier of rights, increasing a person’s capacity to enjoy all 
other rights.68 It is difficult to imagine egregious breaches of children’s 
rights, Lundy contends, in situations where they have been fully and 
effectively involved in determining the outcome of the decisions which 
affect them.69 Children’s participation has a transformative potential also 
because it develops children’s rights consciousness,70 provides a sense of 
self-efficacy, and raises self-esteem.71 These arguments are also relevant 
to freedom of speech.72 
IV. HOW DOES THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATION IMPLICATE A FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH ANALYSIS? AN INQUIRY INTO AMERICAN CASE LAW 
DISCUSSING FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN SCHOOL 
The previous sections examined the conceptual and structural 
differences between children’s right to participation and freedom of 
speech in school, as well as the justifications for respecting, protecting, 
and fulfilling those rights. The following section employs these 
normative and theoretical frameworks in order to analyze how children’s 
rights to participation and free speech correspond in different situations. 
It uses as a database American case law analyzing children’s freedom of 
speech at school. Section IV(A) presents the four cases in which the U.S. 
 
 67  Bennett Woodhouse, supra note 24, at 1589 (“Having a voice is a matter of basic human 
right, even when one does not yet have the right to make the ultimate decision about matters under 
discussion.”); See also Lundy, supra note 26, at 940; Sinclair, supra note 46, at 108. 
 68  Lundy, supra note 26, at 940. 
 69  Id. 
 70  On the interrelations of rights consciousness and education see Calvin Morrill et al., 
Legal Mobilization in Schools: The Paradox of Rights and Race among Youth, 44 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 651 (2010); Shulamit Almog & Lotem Perry-Hazan, The Ability to Claim and the Opportunity 
to Imagine: Rights Consciousness and the Education of Ultra-Orthodox Girls, 40 J. OF L. & EDUC. 
273 (2011). 
 71  See Sinclair, supra note 46, at 108. 
 72  See Roy Harris, Freedom of Speech and Philosophy of Education, 57 BRIT. J. OF EDUC. 
STUD. 111, 125 (2009) (arguing the freedom of speech is the archetypal freedom, which is a 
prerequisite to other freedoms). 
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Supreme Court set the guiding limits of school children’s free speech. As 
mentioned above, the restrictions on school children’s free speech set by 
these cases are similar to the restrictions found in Article 13 of the CRC. 
Section IV(B) categorizes fifty-six cases that discussed freedom of 
speech in school. The categories differ according to how the right to 
participation in each case implicates First Amendment free speech 
analysis. The inquiry does not pretend to provide unequivocal or 
comprehensive answers regarding each and every ruling. Instead, it 
offers an overview of the interrelationships between the right to 
participation and freedom of speech in different circumstances, which 
may serve as a road map for a detailed contextual analysis of specific 
cases. 
The cases were located in the LexisNexis database by a systematic 
search of the U.S. Supreme Court cases discussing freedom of speech in 
schools. In order to keep the coherence of the analysis, several kinds of 
cases were excluded from the search results, which included more than 
200 cases: (1) cases that raised questions that are unique to the American 
constitutional framework regarding the role of religion in public schools; 
(2) cases that concerned school policy and not a specific expression; (3) 
cases that regulated the forum rather than the speech itself; and (4) cases 
that discussed off-campus and online expressions. These cases raise 
additional questions beyond the scope of this Article. 
A. The First Amendment Doctrine of Children’s Free Speech in School 
In the landmark 1969 Supreme Court case Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District, the Court overturned the 
suspensions of three students who wore black armbands in a public 
school to protest the Vietnam War.73 Students do not “shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate,” the Court declared.74 The Court set standards for 
limiting student speech in school when school officials could reasonably 
forecast that it would materially and substantially disrupt the work and 
discipline of the school, or invade the rights of others.75 
Other decisions of the Supreme Court offered additional guidelines, 
effectively expanding the Tinker ruling. In the 1986 case, Bethel School 
District v. Fraser, the Court upheld the suspension of a student who 
delivered a vulgar speech nominating a fellow student for elective office. 
 
 73  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cnty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 74  Id. at 506. 
 75  Id. at 513–14. 
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During the speech, the speaker referred to the candidate in explicit sexual 
metaphors. The Court ruled that the First Amendment does not prevent 
school officials from determining that vulgar and lewd speech is 
undermining “the school’s basic educational mission.”76 
Two years later, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the 
Court approved the decision of a school principal to eliminate two 
articles from a school-sponsored student newspaper.77 One of the articles 
described the pregnancy experiences of three of the school’s students. 
The other dealt with the impact of divorce on the author, who was 
identified by name and made critical comments about her father. The 
Court ruled that educators do not offend the First Amendment by 
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech 
in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are 
“reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”78 The Court 
differentiated between “educators’ ability to silence a student’s personal 
expression that happens to occur on the school premises” and “educators’ 
authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and 
other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the 
public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”79 
In the latter cases, the Court noted, these activities may fairly be 
characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur 
in a traditional classroom setting.80 
In the 2007 case Morse v. Frederick – the most recent Supreme 
Court case regarding students’ free speech rights – the Court upheld a 
suspension of a student who displayed a banner stating “Bong Hits 4 
Jesus” at a school-sanctioned and school-supervised event that took place 
off campus.81 The principal regarded the banner as promoting drug use 
and directed the student to take it down, but he refused to do so. The 
Court held that “schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to 
their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging 
illegal drug use.”82 
In Fraser, Hazelwood and Morse, the Court affirmed the values 
 
 76  Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). “The undoubted freedom to 
advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced against the 
society’s countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate 
behavior.” Id. at 681. 
 77  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1987). 
 78  Id. at 273. 
 79  Id. at 271. 
 80  Id. 
 81  Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 398–400 (2007). 
 82  Id. at 397. 
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underlying the Tinker standard, but acknowledged the schools’ 
educational justifications for diverging from those values in certain 
situations. As mentioned, these four cases create a normative framework 
that is similar to Article 13 of the CRC. It allows school officials to 
restrict students’ speech if the speech invades the rights of others, if 
school officials could reasonably forecast that it materially and 
substantially disrupts the work and discipline of the school, or if there are 
legitimate pedagogical rationales for the restriction. 
B. When the Right to Participation Encounters the First Amendment 
Lower courts applied Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse in cases 
involving various circumstances of on-campus speech. In this subsection, 
I will examine the rulings and their correspondence with the right to 
participation. The first part of the analysis will present cases in which the 
courts approved the students’ expressions. The second part of the 
analysis will present several categories of cases in which the courts 
prohibited the students’ expressions. The categories include expressions 
of young students, threatening expressions, expressions that advocated 
illegal behavior, vulgar expressions, offensive expressions, and 
dissenting expressions. 
1. Permitted expressions 
Many of the rulings in favor of the students involve circumstances 
that were similar to Tinker, such as wearing controversial T-shirts,83 
armbands,84 buttons,85 and bracelets.86 The courts also ruled in favor of 
students who distributed written materials during non-instructional 
 
 83   See Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 2002) (T-shirt 
inscribing with “redneck” jokes); K.D. v Filmore Central Sch. Dist., No. 05-CV-0336(E), 2005 US 
Dist LEXIS 33871 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) (pro-life T-shirt); Guiles ex rel. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 
320 (2d Cir. 2006) (T-shirt criticizing George Bush as a “chicken-hawk” president and accusing him 
of being a former alcohol and cocaine user); Gillman ex rel. Gillman v. Sch. Bd. for Holmes Cnty., 
567 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (N.D. Fla. 2008) (T-shirts expressing support for homosexual persons); 
Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 636 F.3d 874 (7th Cir. 2011) (T-shirt bearing a “Be 
Happy, Not Gay” slogan). 
 84  Lowry ex rel. Crow v. Watson Chapel Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 752 (8th Cir. 2008) (black 
armbands in protest of the school uniform policy); C.H. v. Bridgeton Bd. of Educ., No. 09-
5815(RBK/JS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40038 (D.N.J. 2010) (black and red tape armbands saying 
“Life”). 
 85   Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1992) (“scab” buttons stating 
“Student united for fair settlement” worn by students who were children of striking school teachers); 
DePinto v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 514 F. Supp. 2d 633 (D.N.J. 2007) (buttons stating “No School 
Uniforms” over a slashed red circle that contained a photograph of the Hitler Youth). 
 86   B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2013) (cancer 
awareness bracelets bearing the slogan “I Love Boobies”). 
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times,87 published articles in the school newspaper,88 and expressed 
controversial opinions in class.89 These cases involved various 
expressions, which included, inter alia, a T-shirt criticizing George Bush 
as a “chicken-hawk” president and accusing him of being a former 
alcohol and cocaine user,90 buttons stating “No School Uniforms” over a 
photograph of the Hitler Youth,91 pro-life and abortion literature,92 cancer 
awareness materials that included the word “Boobies,”93 written 
materials criticizing a school official for having “a sick mind,”94 and 
negative comments about homosexuality.95 Most of the expressions in 
these cases were participatory. However, these expressions did not go 
beyond attempts to change students’ opinions. The few expressions that 
concerned school policy—the school uniform or the behavior of school 
officials—did not shape channels for mobilizing the students’ opinions 
into actions and did not use dialogic organizational spaces that may 
promote such actions. As will be elaborated later, when the students 
mobilized their expressions and strived for a stronger influence, their 
expressions did not receive the courts’ protection. 
 
 87  Scoville v. Bd. of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970) (criticism of school officials, 
including statements regarding the senior dean that has “a sick mind” and “poses a threat to our 
community”); Bowler v. Town of Hudson, 514 F. Supp. 2d 168 (D. Mass. 2007) (posters advertising 
a conservative club listing a website address, which contained a link to another website hosting 
graphic footage of hostage beheadings); Raker v. Frederick Cnty. Pub. Sch., 470 F. Supp. 2d 634 
(W.D. Va. 2007) (abortion literature); C.H. v. Bridgeton Bd. of Edu., No. 09-5815 (RBK/JS), 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40038 (D.N.J. 2010) (anti-abortion flyers). 
 88  Dean v. Utica Cnty. Sch., 345 F. Supp. 2d 799 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (an article in the high 
school’s newspaper about a lawsuit filed by residents of a neighborhood adjoining the school 
district’s bus garage who claimed that diesel fumes from idling buses constituted a nuisance); 
Desilets v. Clearview Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 647 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1994) (reviews of R-rated movies in 
the school paper. The reviews only referred to materials that included inappropriate content and did 
not include such content). 
 89  Glowacki v. Howell Pub. Sch. Dist., No. 2:11-cv-15481, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85960 
(E.D. Mich. 2013) (a student said in class “I don’t accept gays” during an anti-bullying day). 
 90  Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d. 320. 
 91  DePinto v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 514 F. Supp. 2d 633 (D.N.J. 2007). 
 92  K.D. v. Filmore Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 05-CV-0336(E), 2005 US Dist LEXIS 33871 
(W.D.N.Y. 2005); Raker v. Fredrick Cnty. Pub. Sch., 470 F. Supp. 2d 634 (W.D. Va. 2007); C.H., 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40038. 
 93  B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 94  Scoville v. Bd. of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970). 
 95  Zamecnik v. Indiana Prairie Sch. Dist., 636 F.3d 874 (7th Cir. 2011); Glowacki 
v. Howell Pub. Sch. Dist., No. 2:11-cv-15481, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85960 (E.D. Mich. 2013). 
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2. Prohibited expressions 
a. The question of age: Expressions of elementary and middle school 
students.  
There were four cases in which the prominent rationale for limiting 
students’ expressions was their young age. Three cases discussed 
controversial statements on bracelets or clothing, including “Unfair 
Grades,” “Racism,” and “I Hate Lost Creek,”96 pictures of fetuses,97 and 
“I love Boobies! (Keep A Breast).”98 As noted, similar statements were 
approved in high schools. In the fourth case, the prohibited expression 
was a petition stating, “[w]e 3rd grade kids don’t want to go to the circus 
because they hurt animals. We want a better feild [sic] trip.”99 
Limiting certain expressions to certain ages corresponds to the right 
to participation, which is adapted to the age and maturity of the children. 
Yet a blanket prohibition on controversial expressions in elementary and 
middle schools does not recognize the evolving capacities of children. 
For example, in Baxter v. Vigo County School Corporation100 the Court 
avoided any discussion regarding the evolving capacities of the 
elementary school student who wore a T-shirt reading “Unfair Grades,” 
“Racism,” and “I Hate Lost Creek.” The Court noted that given the 
indications in Fraser and Hazelwood that age is a relevant factor in 
assessing the extent of a student’s free speech rights in school, in 
addition to the dearth of case law in the lower federal courts, the 
violation of the freedom of speech was not “clearly established.”101 
In Walker-Serrano ex rel. Walker v. Leonard102 the prohibited 
expression was a petition objecting to a planned third grade outing to the 
circus. The court ruled that, “even if elementary school children are 
entitled to some protection under the First Amendment, it might be 
argued that, under Tinker, they have no right to seek signatures from 
their peers on a petition of the kind at issue here.”103 Implicit in 
 
 96  Baxter v. Vigo Cnty. Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 97  T.A. ex rel. Amador v. McSwain Union Elem. Sch., No. 1:08-cv-01986-OWW-DLB, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71973 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 
 98  K.J. ex rel. Braun v. Sauk Prairie Sch. Dist., No. 11-cv-622-bbc, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
187689 (W.D. Wis. 2012). The Court noted that the school officials “made efforts to tailor their 
speech regulations to the age and maturity level of their students by not banning the bracelets in the 
high school.” Id. at 23. 
 99  Walker-Serrano v. Leonard, 325 F.3d 412 (3d Cir 2002). 
 100  Baxter, 26 F.3d at 728. 
 101  Id. at 738. 
 102  Walker-Serrano, 325 F.3d at 412. 
 103  Id. at 418. 
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petitioning activity, the court noted, “that the young listener is capable of 
comprehending the advocated position.”104 Although the plaintiff pointed 
out that one of the third grade textbooks contained a lesson in which the 
students are asked to circulate a petition on a matter of community 
concern, the court found that the record does not support a First 
Amendment violation claim, “even if Walker-Serrano’s petition caused 
no disruption.”105 The concurring opinion stated that “it is unlikely that 
the third grade children here could have had knowledge of how a circus 
treats its animals” and that “an eight or nine-year old child might not be 
able to resist the peer pressure to sign a petition and thus might do so 
even if the petition advocates a position with which he or she does not 
agree.”106 In terms of promoting the right to participation, these 
difficulties may be benefits. When voices strive for influence by 
engaging other students, they become participatory. Amanda Walker-
Serrano’s petition may have encouraged her classmates to ask questions 
about circus animals and to make more informed decisions. Are they too 
young to ask questions about how circus animals should be treated? 
What is the balance between the damage of signing a petition that they 
do not fully understand and the lessons that they can learn about 
participation, civic engagement, and responsibility? In which ways the 
overt and hidden school curriculum of this elementary school might 
clash? These questions remained unanswered. 
b. Intimidating and silencing: Threatening expressions.  
Another category of prohibited expressions includes threatening 
expressions. Students who threatened other students or teachers on 
school grounds,107 as well as students who wrote or showed threatening 
expressions on school grounds,108 did not receive the protection of the 
First Amendment. Prohibited expressions included severe threats,109 
 
 104  Id. 
 105  Id. 
 106  Id. at 420 (Greenberg, J., concurring). 
 107   Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 1996); S.G. ex rel. A.G. v. 
Sayreville Bd. of Edu., 333 F.3d 417 (3d Cir. 2003); Johnson v. New Brighton Area Sch. Dist., No. 
06-1672, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72023 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008); Cuff v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 
677 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 108   LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist, 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001); Demers v. Leominster Sch. 
Dep’t, 263 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D. Mass. 2003); Wilson v. Hinsdale Elementary Sch. Dist., 810 N.E.2d 
637 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978 (11th Cir. 2007); Ponce v. 
Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 2007); Kelly v. Bd. of Educ., No. 06 C 1512, 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1824 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
 109  Lovell, 90 F.3d at 367 (a student told a guidance counselor: “[i]f you don’t give me this 
schedule change, I’m going to shoot you!”); Johnson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72023  (a student told 
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drawing of gang signs,110 or shouting, “I’m going to shoot you” during a 
cops-and-robbers play at a kindergarten.111 Threatening expressions do 
not collide with the right to participation. Whether they are more or less 
serious, threatening expressions have no dialogic goal. Moreover, 
threatening expressions may silence participatory expressions by creating 
an intimidating educational climate. 
c. Questioning the law: Expressions advocating illegal behavior.  
Advocating illegal behavior is also prohibited under current case 
law. Some of the relevant cases discussed expressions advocating 
physical violence, such as a T-shirt printed with “Terrorist Hunting 
Permit” and a “No Bag Limit” superimposed over a larger automatic 
handgun,112 or a slogan on a student’s hands in support of a former 
student accused of shooting a police officer.113 Another case discussed an 
unofficial newspaper that included an article justifying vandalism against 
the homes of teachers.114 Several years before the Supreme Court’s 
Morse decision, lower courts prohibited a school band’s song advocating 
drug use115 and Marilyn Manson T-shirts promoting “destructive 
conduct.”116 
In certain cases, expressions that advocate illegal behavior may be 
participatory. Restricting such expressions at school should start by 
surveying the political discourse in regard to the specific behavior. While 
it is plainly unacceptable to advocate violence or vandalism, there is a 
legitimate discourse regarding drug use. Yet the Morse case, which ruled 
that schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care 
from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug 
 
other students: “[i]f you guys don’t quit calling me that, I’m going to pull a Columbine.”); Cuff, 677 
F.3d at 109 (in response to a classroom assignment a student wrote: “[b]low up the school with the 
teachers in it”); LaVine, 257 F.3d at 981 (a poem that described the student author shooting other 
students); Demers, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 195 (a drawing that depicted the superintendent with a gun 
pointed at his head and explosives at his feet); Wilson, 810 N.E.2d at 637 (a song about the pregnant 
science teacher entitled “Gonna Kill Mrs. Cox’s Baby”); Boim, 494 F.3d at 978 (entry in a school 
notebook describing how the student shoots the math teacher); Ponce, 508 F.3d at 765 (a notebook 
diary, written in the first-person perspective, in which the student detailed the  creation of a pseudo-
Nazi group and a plan to commit a “Columbine shooting” attack). 
 110  Kelly, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1824. 
 111  S.G., 333 F.3d at 417. 
 112   Miller ex rel. Miller v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 588 F. Supp. 2d 606 (E.D. Pa. 2008). 
 113   Brown ex rel. Brown v. Cabell Co. Bd. of Educ., 714 F. Supp. 2d 587 (S.D.W. Va. 
2010). 
 114   Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 686 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Minn. 1987). 
 115   McCann v. Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist., 50 F. Supp. 2d 918 (E.D. Mo. 1999). 
 116   Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000). 
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use,117 was not about participation. The goal of Joseph Frederick, who 
displayed a banner stating “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” at an off-campus school 
event, was to get the camera crews’ attention.118 He claimed that the 
words on the banner were “nonsense.”119 In Justice Alito’s concurring 
opinion, with whom Justice Kennedy joined, it was noted that the ruling 
“provides no support for any restriction of speech that can plausibly be 
interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue, including 
speech on issues such as ‘the wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing 
marijuana for medicinal use.’”120 This statement focuses on the 
difference between participatory and non-participatory expressions. It 
may assist in identifying those expressions that aim to participate in a 
legitimate political discourse about the advantages and disadvantages of 
drug use. This is not to say that Frederick’s expression should not have 
been limited. It may be protected under freedom of speech doctrine, but 
it does not deserve additional protection for being participatory. 
d. Bad taste or a generation gap? Vulgar expressions.  
In accordance with Fraser, courts consistently disapprove of 
expressions that had sexual connotations. These expressions included 
condoms with stickers handed out during a student council campaign,121 
a sexually-explicit cartoon that was published in an independent student 
newspaper accompanying an article entitled “Alumni Advice: Sex is 
fun!” 122 a t-shirt reading “Drugs Suck,”123 and a video made in 
connection with a film arts class, which depicted the story of teenage 
parents and contained profanity and explicit reference to sexual 
activity.124 
As the Fraser case exemplifies, vulgar expressions may have strong 
participatory elements. They may attract more attention to a debate, 
sharpen the messages on one or both sides of the issue, and engage 
students who usually do not join participatory frameworks. They may 
also question the limits of childhood and the expectable behavior of 
children. Yet vulgarity may be not merely poor taste. It may also make 
children uncomfortable and, in certain circumstances, lead to sexual 
 
 117  Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007). 
 118  Id. at 401, 426, 443. 
 119  Id. at 401. 
 120  Id. at 422. 
 121  Henerey ex rel. Henerey v. City of St. Charles, 200 F.3d 1128 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 122   R.O. ex rel. Ochshorn v. Ithaca City Sch. Dist., 645 F.3d 533 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 123  Broussard v. Sch. Bd. of the City of Norfolk, 801 F. Supp. 1526 (E.D. Va. 1992). 
 124  Lopez v. Tulare Joint Union High Sch. Dist. Bd. of Trs., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 762 (Ct. App. 
1995). 
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harassment. In his dissenting opinion in Fraser, Justice Stevens noted 
that Matthew Fraser “was probably in a better position to determine 
whether an audience composed of 600 of his contemporaries would be 
offended by the use of a four-letter word—or a sexual metaphor—than is 
a group of judges who are at least two generations and 3,000 miles away 
from the scene of the crime.”125 Indeed, it is difficult to determine what 
children understand to be the purpose of certain behaviors or 
expressions. Setting the pedagogical justifications for restricting 
expressions that have sexual connotations requires a dialogic process, in 
which children and adults share the power of decision-making. Such a 
process may assist in bridging the generation gap Justice Stevens 
described in his dissent and in shaping better decisions. 
e. Hurting people’s feelings: Expressions that offended teachers, parents 
or students.  
A related category of prohibited expressions includes different kinds 
of offensive expressions. Most of the prohibited offensive expressions 
were racial statements or symbols, such as the confederate flag126 or a 
“Johnny Reb” cartoon.127 One case prohibited Caucasian students from 
wearing American flag shirts in a school plagued by fights between 
Caucasian and Mexican students.128 In the special context of this case, 
the shirts seemed clearly designed to offend the Mexican students, 
induce violence, and risk students’ safety.129 Other cases discussed 
bullying and harassment include cyber bullying of a teacher who was 
photographed in class,130 calling the assistant principal a “dick,”131 and 
putting a sign in a student’s work area stating “[m]aking a mountain out 
of a molehill” (relating to a fellow students’ parents who asked not to use 
quotes given by their son for publication in an Internet article).132 Such 
expressions, which have the main goal to offend, have no participatory 
elements. 
More complicated cases involved offensive expressions that had a 
 
 125  Bethel School Dist., 478 U.S. at 692. 
 126   Denno ex rel. Denno v. School Bd., 218 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. Fla. 2000); West v. Derby 
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir. 2000); B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7 Sch. Dist., 
508 F. Supp. 2d 740 (E.D. Mo. 2007); Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2008); Defoe v. Spiva, 
625 F.3d 324 (6th Cir. 2010); Hardwick ex rel. Hardwick v. Heyward, 711 F.3d 426 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 127  Crosby v. Holsinger, 852 F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 128  Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 745 F.3d 354 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 129  Id. at 359–360. 
 130  Requa v. Kent Sch. Dist., 492 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (W.D. Wash. 2007). 
 131  Posthumus, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 895. 
 132  Fister ex rel. Fister v. Minnesota New Country Sch., 1998 149 F.3d 1187 (8th Cir. 1998). 
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participatory goal. In Poling v. Murphy,133 the prohibited expression was 
a school assembly speech. Dean Poling, a candidate for the student 
council, delivered a speech that has the following peroration: 
The administration plays tricks with your mind and they hope you 
won’t notice. For example, why does Mr. Davidson stutter while he is 
on the intercom? He doesn’t have a speech impediment. If you want to 
break the iron grip of this school, vote for me for president. I can try to 
bring back student rights that you have missed and maybe get things 
that you have always wanted.134 
Two of the other student candidates came to the faculty sponsors of the 
student council and complained Poling gained an unfair advantage in the 
election by his speech regarding Mr. Davidson.135 The incumbent student 
council president also expressed this opinion.136 Consequently, Poling 
was declared ineligible to run.137 The court approved the decision and 
ruled that the school acted reasonably in line with constitutional aims by 
requiring students to state their views without ridiculing personalities and 
unnecessarily hurting the feelings of others.138 
Another case of an offensive expression with a participatory goal is 
Wildman v. Marshalltown School District.139 In this case, Rebecca 
Wildman, who participated in the basketball team, distributed the 
following letter in the school’s locker room: 
To all of my teammates:  
Everyone has done a great job this year and now is the time that we 
need to make ourselves stronger and pull together. It was a tough loss 
last night but we will get it back. We have had some bumps in the road 
to success but every team does and the time is here for us to smoothen 
it out. Everyone on this team is important whether they think so or not. 
After watching last nights [sic] Varsity game and seeing their 
sophomores play up I think and I think [sic] that some of you are think 
[sic] the same thing. I think that we have to fight for our position. Am I 
the only one who thinks that some of us should be playing Varsity or 
even JV? We as a team have to do something about this. I want to say 
something to Coach Rowles. I will not say anything to him without the 
whole teams [sic] support. He needs us next year and the year after and 
what if we aren’t there for him? It is time to give him back some of the 
 
 133  Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1989). 
 134  Id. at 759. 
 135  Id. at 759–60. 
 136  Id. at 760. 
 137  Id. 
 138  Id. at 763. 
 139  Wildman v. Marshalltown Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2001). 
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bullshit that he has given us. We are a really great team and by the time 
we are seniors and we ALL have worked hard we are going to have an 
AWESOME season. We deserve better then [sic] what we have gotten. 
We now need to stand up for what we believe in!!! 140 
The school told Wildman she could not continue to participate with the 
sophomore basketball team unless she apologized to her teammates for 
writing the letter. She refused to apologize and did not practice with the 
team or play in the season’s remaining six games.141 Following the 
school year, Wildman and her family moved to another school district 
and sued for damages.142 The court ruled that Wildman’s letter, 
“containing the word ‘bullshit’ in relation to other language in it and 
motivated by her disappointment at not playing on the varsity team, 
constitutes insubordinate speech toward her coaches.”143 Since the speech 
called only for an apology, the court noted “[N]o basis exists for a claim 
of a violation of free speech.”144 
Poling’s speech, which was delivered during a campaign for the 
student council, and Wildman’s letter, which aimed to recruit her 
teammates for what Wildman thought was a just cause, are participatory 
expressions. Both of them strived for influence and mobilized opinions 
into actions. Both of them aspired to share decision-making power with 
adults. Poling wanted to use the structural organizational space of the 
student council. Wildman created her own channel of influence. Yet, as 
the court noted in regard to Poling’s speech, students should learn not to 
offend other people when they participate. Participation, as freedom of 
speech, is not absolute. Its justifications are undermined when the 
expressions are offensive. 
In each and every case there should be, however, careful 
consideration of whether or not the expression was limited because it 
was offensive or because it was unpleasant. In the Poling case, the 
offensive remark regarding Mr. Davidson was the direct reason for the 
restriction. Moreover, other students complained that Poling gained an 
unfair political advantage by his remarks. Contrarily, Wildman’s 
offensive remark regarding the coach’s “bullshit” did not lie within the 
core of the message. It was not clear whether the court disapproved of 
the letter because it contained the word “bullshit” or because it was 
 
 140  Id. at 770. 
 141  Id. 
 142  Id. 
 143  Id. at 772. 
 144  Id. 
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“insubordinate.”145 An analysis that takes into account the right to 
participation should draw a clearer line between participatory offensive 
expressions and participatory unpleasant expressions, define the goal of 
the limitation, and shape educational reactions that emphasize the 
importance of mobilizing students’ voices into actions and influence. 
Accordingly, an apology for using the word “bullshit” rather than for 
writing the letter may have been a better educational solution, which 
could have prevented the entire controversy. 
f. Criticizing and protesting: Dissenting expressions.  
In Pinard v. Clatskanie School District146 a group of students who 
played on the high school basketball team signed a petition requesting 
their coach resign.147  The petition stated the following:148 
As of February 12, 2001, the Clatskanie Tigers Boys Varsity Basketball 
Team would like to formally request the immediate resignation of 
Coach Jeff Baughman. As a team we no longer feel comfortable 
playing for him as a coach. He has made derogative [sic] remarks, 
made players uncomfortable playing for him, and is not leading the 
team in the right direction. We feel that as a team and as individuals we 
would be better off if we were to finish the season with a replacement 
coach. We, the undersign [sic], believe this is in the best interest of the 
team, school, town, and for the players and fans. We would appreciate 
the full cooperation of all the parties involved. 
When the students delivered the petition to the coach, he immediately 
took it to the high school principal and asked for permission to take off 
the remainder of the day, which the principal granted.149 The principal 
did not ask the coach whether he would coach that evening’s game.150 
Once home, the coach called the junior varsity coach and stated that he 
wanted “to know who his back-stabbers were” and “to corner the little 
sons-of bitches.”151 
After the coach left the school, the principal called a meeting with all 
of the players who had signed the petition. The players were presented 
with two options: the players could participate in a mediation process 
and board the team bus for the game that evening or they could adhere to 
 
 145  Id. 
 146  Pinard v. Clatskanie School District, 467 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 147  Id. at 760. 
 148  Id. at 760–61. 
 149  Id. at 761. 
 150  Id. 
 151  Id. 
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their position and forfeit their privilege to play in the game. They were 
not advised that they would be disciplined further for choosing the 
second option.152 Later in the day, the coach informed the principal and 
the superintendent that he was not going to coach the game that evening; 
the superintendent then made arrangements for a substitute coach but did 
not inform the players of the coach’s decision.153 With the exception of 
one student, each of the players who had signed the petition chose not to 
board the bus and did not play in the game “to demonstrate their resolve 
and sincerity concerning the petition and complaints.”154 At the game, the 
junior varsity team played in place of the eight missing players and lost 
the game by more than 50 points.155 The next day, the players who signed 
the petition and refused to board the bus were permanently suspended 
from the team.156 
The court found that the coach was indeed verbally abusive and 
“highly intimidating,” as the students had complained.157 
Applying Tinker, the court held that the students’ petition and complaints 
against their coach were protected speech because that speech could not 
reasonably have led school officials to forecast substantial disruption of 
or material interference with a school activity.158 However, the plaintiffs’ 
refusal to board the bus was properly punishable by the defendants as 
unprotected speech because, as the District Court found, the game 
boycott substantially disrupted and materially interfered with the 
operation of the varsity boys basketball program.159 The court asserted 
the fact that “the school succeeded in obtaining substitute players—albeit 
of lesser experience and ability—may have mitigated the disruptive 
effects of the plaintiffs’ actions, but it did not eliminate them or render 
them less than substantial.”160 
 
 152  Id. at 761. 
 153  Id. at 762. 
 154  Id. 
 155  Id. 
 156  Id. at 763. 
 157  Id. at 760. For example, one of the students testified that after a game, the coach had him 
“hold a basketball while the coach ‘slapped’ and ‘beat’ at it (also hitting [the student’s] arms) to 
make sure he was holding the ball tightly. [The coach] then made a triangular shape with his fingers 
and told the student, ‘You know what this is? This is what you are. You are a fucking pussy.’ 
Describing the coach’s intimidation tactics, another student testified that [the coach] once told the 
team, ‘I can fuck with your minds in so many ways you won’t know which way is up, and don’t 
think I can’t. I’ll make your lives a living hell.’ [The student] explained that the players did not 
report Baughman’s behavior because Baughman made it clear that ‘anything that happened in the 
locker room stays in the locker room.’” Id. 
 158  Id. at 772. 
 159  Id. 
 160  Id. at 770. The case was remanded to the district court to consider in the first instance 
whether the plaintiffs’ protected speech (their petition and complaints against the coach) was a 
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The decisive argument in this case was the rationale of Tinker—the 
substantial disruption to the operation of the basketball program. A 
question remains whether there should be any balance between the 
substantial disruption rationale and educational rationales. Should 
educators ban any substantial disruption to the work and discipline of the 
school, even if the disruption is a protest that may teach students 
significant democratic lessons? In Pinard, a dialogue between the 
students and the school officials over the petition, in which the students 
felt that their complaints were heard and respected, may have prevented 
the strike. When school officials failed to create such dialogue, there are 
strong pedagogical reasons that justify participatory actions. Indeed, the 
students’ actions disturbed the operation of the basketball program, just 
as strikes substantially disturb the work of businesses, paralyze the 
market, and harden the life of citizens. The court should have engaged in 
a much more substantial discussion regarding the role of protests and 
strikes in a democracy. 
In a similar case, Lowery v. Euverard,161 high school football players 
were dismissed from their high school football team after signing a 
petition that stated, “I hate Coach Euverard and I don’t want to play for 
him.” The students alleged that the coach struck a player in the helmet, 
threw away college recruiting letters to disfavored players, humiliated 
and degraded players, used inappropriate language, and required a year-
round conditioning program in violation of high school rules.162 They 
intended to give the petition to the school principal, in order to have the 
coach replaced.163 When the coach found out about the petition, he 
dismissed all the students from the team who did not apologize.164 
The court noted that “[p]ublic schools are necessarily not run as a 
democracy.   Schools exist to provide a forum whereby those with 
wisdom and experience (the teachers) impart knowledge to those who 
lack wisdom and experience (the students).”165 The court applied Tinker 
and ruled, [r]equiring coaches to tolerate attacks on their authority would 
effectively strip them of their ability to lead.166 The court noted, “[i]t 
would also do a great disservice to other players who wish to play on a 
team free from strife and disunity.”167 The “disrespectful and 
 
substantial or motivating factor in the defendants’ disciplinary action. Id. at 772. 
 161  Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 162  Id. at 585. 
 163  Id. 
 164  Id. at 586. 
 165  Id. at 588. 
 166  Id. at 599. 
 167  Id. 
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insubordinate actions” of the students were compared by the court to a 
player “giving ‘lip’ to a coach during practice” or a student “making a 
smart aleck remark to a teacher.”168 The court emphasized that Tinker 
does not require teachers to surrender control of the classroom to 
students, and it does not require coaches to surrender control of the team 
to players.169 
The Lowery decision is harsher than the Pinard ruling. It silences the 
voices of students who strive to change a disrespectful educational 
environment. A petition against an abusive coach is not comparable to a 
player “giving ‘lip’ to a coach during practice” or a student “making a 
smart aleck remark to a teacher.”170 An analysis that takes into account 
the right to participation may reveal the educational differences between 
such cases. Indeed, we do not want to educate children to ridicule other 
people. We do want, however, to educate them to stand up when 
someone makes unjustified derogatory remarks towards them, especially 
in relationships of authority. The litigation in Lowery continued two 
more years after the sixth circuit’s decision in light of a dispute regarding 
the rights of the suspended athletes’ parents to appear before the board of 
education.171 It exemplifies the long-term damages of silencing 
participatory voices. 
The expressions in Pinard and Lowery should be distinguished from 
the expressions in Poling and Wildman. The only rationale for the 
restrictions in Pinard and Lowery was the substantial disruption of the 
dissent. The right to participation provides a normative rationale for 
protecting dissenting expressions in school. It also supports the 
arguments of several American scholars who examined freedom of 
speech in school and identified the need to differentiate between 
harassment and dissent,172 discussed the democratic importance of 
dissent,173 and indicated the tendency of school officials to insulate 
themselves from scrutiny and keep an image of infallibility.174 
V. CONCLUSION 
The analysis in this Article highlights the distinctions between 
 
 168  Id. at 594. 
 169  Id. at 601. 
 170  Id. at 594. 
 171  Lowery v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 685 F.3d 427 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 172  Waldman, supra note 14. 
 173  Stitzlein, supra note 49. 
 174  Brown, supra note16, at 255. 
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participatory and non-participatory expressions in educational 
environments. The normative umbrella of free speech binds these 
expressions together. The right to participation unties the bind and 
captures only expressions that have a dialogic character. It assists in 
identifying those expressions that are invaluable for a democratic society, 
which integrate the civic education curriculum with the school’s 
organizational practices. 
In certain circumstances, such as threatening or offensive 
expressions, the right to participation does not apply. In other 
circumstances, such as dissenting expressions, the right to participation 
offers more protection than the freedom of speech doctrine. Additionally, 
the right to participation provides normative tools for crafting 
distinctions between various vulgar expressions or differing expressions 
that question the law. It also highlights the need to examine children’s 
evolving capacities in each and every case. 
The justifications listed in Section III apply both to the right to 
participation and freedom of speech in schools. However, the analysis of 
the cases demonstrates that most of these justifications are stronger when 
the expressions are participatory. Dialogic expressions that are captured 
by the right to participation have more potential to promote education in 
democracy, equalize educational opportunities, create better educational 
practices, and improve school climate compared to non-participatory 
expressions. They have also more potential to act as a multiplier of 
rights. Threatening or offensive expressions, vulgar expression that have 
no participatory goal, or expressions that promote violence or vandalism 
are not related to these justifications. Therefore, a careful balance is 
required regarding the gaps between participation and speech in 
educational environments. 
In the American context, this Article provides complementary 
educational answers for shaping the limits of the U.S. Supreme Court 
guidelines regarding freedom of speech in school. As mentioned above, 
the right of school children to participation corresponds to American 
values;175 it was not the reason for the rejection of the CRC.176 For 
signatories of the CRC, this Article may provide guidelines to assist in 
analyzing the interrelationships between children’s right to participation 
and their freedom of speech. The fact that the right to participation was 
 
 175  See Kilbourne, supra note 23; Bennett Woodhouse, supra note 24; Shulamit Almog & 
Ariel L. Bendor, The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child Meets the American Constitution: 
Towards a Supreme Law of the World, 11 INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 273 (2003–2004). 
 176  Kilbourne, supra note 23.   
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tailored for children, rather than as an “adult-minus” right,177 means the 
right to participation has the potential to adapt the contours of freedom of 
speech in school to the special circumstances of childhood and 
schooling. 
Future research may examine how the right to participation may be 
applied in cases of students’ online expressions. Future research may 
also examine how the right to participation may be implemented in 
school policies regulating the reactions of school officials to 
controversial expressions. Participatory policies, such as restorative 
practices,178 may not only fulfill the right to participation but also prevent 
the unnecessary conflicts that top-down zero tolerance policies induce.179 
The numerous American cases that were analyzed exemplify the high 
educational prices of legal battles over school discipline.180 Adopting 
participatory policies for resolving conflicts in schools may benefit 
students, parents, teachers, and school officials. 
The final words are dedicated to the most significant agents of school 
children’s participation—teachers. The distinction made between speech 
and participation may assist teachers in drawing the line between 
expressions that mock and degrade them and expressions that may 
nurture a collaborative educational climate. It may also assist teachers in 
articulating this line to students, parents, lawyers, and judges. Yet, in 
cases of dissenting expressions, it is not simple for teachers to respect, 
protect, and fulfill the right to participation. Without understanding the 
children’s right to participation, and believing in its benefits, teachers 
will not mobilize this right by sharing their power and by shaping 
participatory spaces. Therefore, it is important to provide teachers with 
human rights education and continuous professional support. As Mitra 
and Gross note, it is important to empower teachers as professionals in 
their broader institutional environment, since disempowered teachers 
cannot empower their students.181 The right to participation depends, 
 
 177  Buss, supra note 62, at 356 (arguing that children’s rights in American case law usually 
have “adult-minus” orientation; they are shaped in light of the rights already afforded to adult). 
 178  See, e.g., Brenda Morrison et al., Practicing Restorative Justice in School Communities: 
The Challenge of Culture Change, 5 PUB. ORG. REV.: A GLOBAL J. 335 (2005); Jean Kane et al., 
Generating an Inclusive Ethos? Exploring the Impact of Restorative Practices in Scottish Schools, 
13(3) INT’L J. OF INCLUSIVE EDUC. 231 (2009); Gillean McCluskeya et al., ‘Teachers Are Afraid We 
Are Stealing their Strength’: A Risk Society and Restorative Approaches in School, 59(2) BRIT. J. OF 
EDUC. STUD. 105 (2011). For the interconnections of restorative justice and the right to participation, 
see TALI GAL, CHILD VICTIMS AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: A NEEDS-RIGHTS MODEL (2011). 
 179  Warnick, supra note 14, at 211, arguing in this regard, that the importance of the 
educational purposes of schools suggests that speech must be restricted in a way that is itself 
educational. 
 180  See PROFFITT DUPRE, supra note 15. 
 181   Mitra & Gross, supra note 25, at 537. 
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therefore, on education policies that refrain from marginalizing teachers 
in all levels of policy-making. A bottom-up school policy, which focuses 
on teachers as agents of children’s participation, is much more useful, 
just, and educational than a top-down legal policy, which focuses on the 
protection of speech and participation in courts. 
 
 
